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THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS
Why It Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed
1989 AMERICAN INCENTIVE SYSTEM
CALENDAR-A Daily Chronicle of Enterprise
In a joint venture project with Louver
Manufacturing Company (Lomanco) of Jacksonville,
Arkansas, the Harding University Students in Free
Enterprise Economics Team presents the 1989
"AMERICAN INCENTIVE SYSTEM
CALENDAR--A Daily Chronicle of Enterprise."

The 1989 "AMERICAN INCENTIVE SYSTEM
CALENDAR" offers 365 brief reminders of great
enterprising events and relevant comments on the
idea of freedom applied to the marketplace. It
should hang on the walls of offices, factories and
school rooms all over the country. A limited
amount of copies are available for $2.00 to cover
printing, postage and handling costs.

STAYING ON TOP IS HARDER
THAN GETTING ON TOP
The Harding University Economics team will
attempt to win its seventh first place trophy at the
National Students in Free Enterprise Competition
next summer. The university economics teams have
won first place six times at the nationals which were
started in 1978. Harding teams, the winningest in
the country to date, were national runners-up in
1978, 1983, 1986, and 1988.
The 1989 team is composed of Ron Cook, CoChairperson from Searcy, Arkansas; Gabrielle
DeMatteis, Co-Chairperson from Richmond,
Virginia; Drue DeMatteis from Richmond, Virginia;
Jim Hull from Columbus, Ohio; Karen Norwood
from Searcy, Arkansas; Sheila Wood from
Mabelvale, Arkansas; and their sponsor, Dr. Don
Diffine, Professor of Economics and Director of the
student-staffed Belden Center for Private Enterprise
Education.

by
James D. Gwartney and Richard E. Wagner
Every president elected during the last two decades has
promised to bring federal spending under control and
reduce the size of the budget deficit. All have failed, in
both tasks. Between 1965 and 1985, federal expenditures
as a share of GNP rose from 17.6 percent to 24.0
percent. The non-defense component of federal spending
expanded even more rapidly, soaring from 10.1 percent
of GNP in 1%5 to 17.6 percent in 1985. Since 1960 the
federal budget has been in deficit 26 out of the 27 years.
By way of comparison, during the 1947-1960 period, there
were seven budget surpluses and seven budget deficits.
The budget process reached new lows in the 1980s.
The annual charade goes along the following lines. The
President submits a budget that includes a large deficit.
After numerous committee hearings and much shadow
boxing, Congress eventually passes a budget resolution
specifying broad categories of spending. After the budget
resolution is passed, separate committees on
appropriations and revenue hammer out specific items in
the budget. Theoretically, a congressional rule bars floor
consideration of appropriations beyond the amount
specified in the budget resolution; but everybody knows
this is a paper lock.
After all, the House has waived this rule nearly 500
times during the decade. The time clock continues to
tick. Before the appropriation bills are passed the new
fiscal year begins. At the last minute, a continuing
resolution is passed in order to keep the government
from closing down. This borrows a little time. A couple
of months after the fiscal year has started, Congress
eventually passes a gigantic appropriations bill (last year's
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bill was 1194 pages long) lined with lots of lard
benefitting key senators and representatives in positions
of power. The president must either sign the bill or close
down the government.
All through this process, politicians from both parties
are on television telling us how they are struggling to
control the budget deficit without cutting into the muscle
of vital government programs.
However, closer
inspection reveals that this tale of struggle is a total
misrepresentation of reality.
The many bizarre items in recent budgets undermine
the credibility of the tale. A North Dakota senator
inserts a $10 million sunflower subsidy program for
growers in his state. A Maryland congressman arranges
for $200,000 to be paid to the City of Frederick for a
ransom it paid to Confederate forces in 1864. A
Nebraska representative pushes through a $20 million
study to see if residents in his district qualified for
disaster relief. During the waning hours prior to the
passage of this year's budget, Senator Daniel Inouye of
Hawaii even sneaked in $8 million to build a school in
France for Jewish refugees.
These are small items when looked at individually. But
they are illustrative of the larger problem: the federal
government's budget process lends itself to inclusion of
spending measures which promote private interests and
the political welfare of legislators at the expense of the
general taxpayer.

WHY THE CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS
IS NOT WORKING
Effective decisionmaking processes must confront those
who make choices with incentives that encourage them to
use resources wisely. Such processes must acknowledge
explicitly that choices inescapably entail costs: to choose
one thing necessarily entails the sacrifice of some valued
alternative. Rational choice is possible only when those
who make choices are confronted with a constraint that
forces them to consider the cost of each option while
seeking to choose the option that provides the most
satisfaction.
The current budgetary process is not working precisely
because it does not force our legislators to make wise
choices. There are four major reasons why this is so.
1. The current budget process blurs costs and thereby
makes it difficult to compare benefits relative to costs on
a program-by-program basis. A decision to adopt a
program is decided independently from a decision to levy
taxes to fund the program. Worse still, Congress decides
if a program should be adopted before it deals with the
funding issue. Rather than deciding how much to spend
and then choosing possible options within the budget
constraint, Congress decides which programs to adopt
and then tries to figure out how to finance them. Of
course, this is precisely the reverse of what we do in the

business and household sectors. In the private sector,
we estimate the resources available during a budget
period and then choose how best to allocate them.
2. Under current rules, the federal budget constraint
is soft. In their personal choices, people confront a
relatively firm budget constraint. If households continue
to spend beyond their means, their eventual inability to
pay their bills and the accompanying loss of credit
worthiness will impose a reality check. Similarly, if
businesses consistently spend beyond their revenues,
losses will result, stock value will decline, and, if
necessary, bankruptcy will eventually terminate the
profligacy.
The current budget process of the federal government
contrasts sharply with that of the private sector, in that
the persons (legislators) making choices confront a much
softer budget constraint. This is not to deny that a
budget constraint ultimately exists, for it surely does. An
increase in federal spending on one program must imply
either a decrease in spending on other programs or an
increase in taxes or borrowing--which in turn will require
a decrease in personal spending. But the constraint is
faced only indirectly and remotely within the federal
government's budget process, whereas it is direct and
immediate in personal choices.
3. The current budget process plays into the hands of
interest groups seeking private gain at public expense.
Our first two points dealt with the general reduction in
rationality that arises because there is no simultaneous
consideration of the benefits and costs of public
programs. Even if everyone had the same interests and
evaluations concerning different possible spending
programs, the budgetary process would be flawed
because of its failure to support rational consideration of
budgetary options. As a result people will support larger
public spending than they would support if they had to
confront directly the full cost of that spending.
It is easy to see why the current process favors special
interest groups. Since their personal stake is large,
members of the interest group (and their representatives)
have a strong incentive to inform themselves and their
allies and to let legislators know how strongly they feel
about an issue of special importance. Many of them will
vote for or against candidates strictly on the basis of
whether they support their interests. In addition, such
interest groups are generally an attractive source of
campaign resources, including financial contributions. In
contrast, most other voters will care little about a special
interest issue. For the non-special interest voter, the
time and energy necessary to examine the issue will
generally exceed any possible personal gain from a
preferred resolution. Thus, most non-special interest
voters will simply ignore such issues.

4. The current budget process promotes the transfer
of resources from production into rent seeking. Modern
public choice theory refers to actions designed to
promote one's interest at the expense of others as rent
seeking. Rather than trying to build that proverbial

better mousetrap, people might lobby for tariffs or quotas
on imports, they might lobby a safety commission to ban
lower cost, competitive mousetraps, or they might lobby
to prevent people from making mousetraps at home.
Rather than applying resources to the creation of wealth,
rent seeking uses resources to redistribute previously
created wealth.

A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
THAT WOULD MITIGATE
THE PROBLEM
The federal government must return to fiscal
responsibility. There can be little doubt about this. But
it would be a mistake to think that all we need is more
budgetary tinkering by the legislature. To the extent our
budgetary problems , are symptomatic of an underlying
erosion of constitutional limitations on congressional
budgetary authority, effective remedy would seem to
require not still more legislation but a reassertion of
constitutional control over legislative authority.
The case for constitutional reformation rests on a
recognition that there are situations in which even though
people's pursuit of their own interests will lead to
generally undesirable outcomes, individually they will
have little incentive to act differently because to do so
would leave them even worse off. Ordinary legislative
processes will not restrain the budgetary excesses that
arise from within a system of unlimited democracy,
because legislators are merely exploiting the opportunities
that existing constitutional rules offer. Better outcomes
require alternative constitutional rules that foreclose
some of the natural excesses of a system of majoritarian
democracy.
What changes in budgetary procedures would bring the
self-interest of the political players more closely into
harmony with the general welfare? There are several
specific actions that would move us in that direction. We
should like to outline the structure of a comprehensive
reform in budget procedures that would do much to
alleviate the major deficiencies of the current process.
We do this not out of any sense that this is the only way
to accomplish budgetary reform, but out of a recognition
that it is necessary to get into some examination of
specifics in order to advance the discussion of budgetary
reform. We refer to this proposal as the Taxpayer
Protection Amendment. There are five provisions of this
amendment.
1. A two-thirds Congressional majority would be
required for approval of an increase in either taxes or
debt. The main impact of this provision would be to
curtail the scope for rent seeking, which in turn is the
contemporary equivalent of what James Madison called
the "violence of faction" in Federalist No. 10. The more
inclusive the degree of consent that is required to enact
budgetary measures, the less is the scope for winning
factions to enact appropriations levels that they would not
support if they had to bear the cost themselves, but

would be only too happy to enact if they can place the
burden of payment on someone else.
2. Prior to the passage of any appropriation bill and
at least five months before the beginning of each fiscal
year, Congress and the President would be required to
set a constraint for the level of fiscal year spending.
Once the spending level constraint is passed, any
spending beyond the limit would require the approval of
a three-fourths majority of both houses. The President
would be required to submit a proposed budget
constraint figure to Congress at least eight months prior
to the beginning of the fiscal year. In order to assure
compliance, the President and each member of Congress
would be fined $5,000 per day if the budget constraint
was not passed within the required time limit.
3. Two-thirds approval of both houses would be
required for passage of any legislation that mandates
spending by states, private businesses or individuals.
This provision is necessary in order to prevent
Congressional use of mandated expenditures as a means
of escaping the limits imposed by the budget constraint.
After all, whether the federal government spends $1
billion on a program to subsidize prescription drug
purchases for the elderly or, alternatively, requires states
to set up such programs as a condition for continuing to
receive highway aid the federal government is having an
identical economic impact. Restricting the ability of the
federal government to directly subsidize particular
citizens at general expense will lead naturally to a search
for indirect ways of doing the same thing.
4. Any new program requiring a budget expenditure
must simultaneously provide for a new source of revenue
(additional taxes or user charges) which will finance the
program. This requirement of a "marginally balanced
budget" will assure that all new spending programs
consider the cost, as well as the benefits, as part of a
single package. This linking of benefits and costs when
a program is considered will provide public sector
decision-makers with an incentive structure more
consistent with that of the private sector. Most assuredly
it will result in more careful consideration of spending
proposals and sounder public sector decisionmaking than
the current process.
5. Finally, an item-reduction veto should be given to
the President. Note that we have said "item-reduction
veto" and not "item veto" or "line-item veto." The
President pretty much had an item veto prior to the
Congressional Budget and lmpoundmcnt Act of 1974, in
that he could impound spending on specific projects.
Forty-three governors presently have item veto authority,
and it might seem that such an authority would be an
effective device for curbing budgetary excesses. However,
the situation is a little more complex than this, which
makes it important to distinguish between an item veto,
in which the executive can either accept or veto a
particular item and an item-reduction veto, in which the
executive can also insert a lower figure without vetoing
the item entirely.

CONCLUSION
A budget process consistent with economic efficiency is
more dependent upon our ability to develop and institute
sound rules and procedures than it is upon our ability to
elect "better" people to political office. Unless we get the
rules right, the political process will continue to be
characterized by special interest legislation, bureaucratic
inefficiency and the waste of rent seeking.
The political incentive structure is like the law of
gravity. Just as Republicans and Democrats both fall at
32 feet per second squared, so too do both engage in
special interest politics and other socially wasteful
political behavior when the political incentive structure
encourages them to do so.
Taken as a package, the Taxpayer Protection
Amendment would reduce the power of special interests,
the attractiveness of rent seeking and the centralization
of power toward Washington. In a more general context,
it would be a modest step toward restoration of
government based on agreement and mutual gain, rather
than majority rule and the power to plunder. No doubt,
many will feel that a reform of the type suggested here is
unrealistic because its passage would require the support
of persons in positions of political power.

However, this obstacle may be more apparent than real.
The current system more or less forces politicians to
abuse their electoral reponsibility--to seize funds from
taxpayers in order to provide political favors to organize
interest groups in exchange for political support. How
many legislators really want to be bagmen for special
interest groups? If they are provided an option, a
surprising number might well be supportive.
The intellectual folly of our age is the view that
democratic elections are all that is necessary for the
preservation of personal liberty. History teaches that this
view is false. The ordinary political process must be
restrained. Constitutional rules based on the mutual
agreement must be instituted and followed.
Unless we begin to recognize the folly of the "everything
is up for grabs" conceptualization of government,
increasing factionalism and growing dissatisfaction with
the results of public policy are in the offing, as Madison
warned in Federalist No. 10. Now is the time to learn
or, more accurately, to relearn the merits of a political
economy based on principles and rules of mutual
agreement. The freedom and prosperity of America are
dependent upon our ability to do so.
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